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This paper examines the demand for complementary health insurance (CHI) in the non-group market in 
France and the reasons why the near poor seem price insensitive. First we develop a theoretical model 
based on a simple trade-off between two goods: CHI and a composite good reflecting all other 
consumptions. Then we estimate a model of CHI consumption and empirically test the impact of 
potential determinants of demand for coverage: risk aversion, asymmetrical information, non-expected 
utility, the demand for quality and health, and supply-side factors such as price discrimination. We 
interpret our empirical findings in terms of crossed price and income elasticity of the demand for CHI. 
Last, we use these estimates of elasticity to simulate the effect of various levels of price subsidies on 
the demand for CHI among those with incomes around the poverty level in France. We find that the 
main motivation for purchasing CHI in France is protection against the financial risk associated with co-
payments in the public health insurance scheme. We also observe a strong income effect suggesting 
that affordability might be an important determinant. Our simulations indicate that no policy of price 
subsidy can significantly increase the take-up of CHI among the near poor; any increase in the level of 
subsidy generates a windfall benefit for richer households. 
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Section 1 – Introduction 
This study examines the demand for voluntary health insurance in France and, more specifically, the 
relationship between income and the quantity of private coverage individuals purchase on the non-
group market.  
 
Voluntary health insurance (VHI) plays an important role alongside the public scheme in European 
countries (Mossialos and Thomson, 2004, from now on MT2004). In some countries VHI serves some 
populations, whether they are allowed to opt out of the public scheme (Germany) or excluded from it 
(Netherlands); MT2004 suggest the name “substitutive health insurance” in this case. In other 
countries, VHI covers ancillary services not included in the public plan or, more importantly, extra-costs 
associated with “better perceived quality of care” such as choice of physician and shorter waiting times 
for non-emergency hospital care (Australia, Spain, and United Kingdom); this is referred to as 
“supplementary health insurance”. Last, as is the case in France (and, to some extent for Medigap 
policies in the US), VHI covers co-payments (including over-billing) of the public scheme and is called 
complementary health insurance, or CHI (MT2004).  
 
The rationale for mixed public-private systems is theoretically straightforward: equity and adverse 
selection provide compelling arguments for universal coverage by a public single insurer and single 
payer (or even, in the US case, for tax exemptions for employer-sponsored plans); however, the 
disconnection in public systems between what one pays and the coverage one benefits from 
exacerbates the tendency toward moral hazard extent in any insurance scheme. The political economy 
literature coins that tendency “over-insurance” and recommends that the public plan be limited to a 
basic level of coverage of what is deemed necessary
5 (Besley and Gouveia,1994). Individuals then 
have the option to voluntarily buy some individual health insurance if they are willing to get more than 
what this basic plan offers: the important thing here is that individuals have to pay the price of that 
insurance topping up the basic plan and, as a result, would purchase it only if the value they get from it 
exceeds the price they are charged for it. In that normative sense there could not be any “over-
insurance” in VHI. 
In the case of supplementary VHI the definition of what is necessary and should be included in the 
basic plan is clear and refers to clinical notions (the second principle in the constitution of the British 
NHS states that “access to services is based on clinical need, not ability to pay”, Department of Health 
                                                 
5   In the German and Dutch cases the notion is that employees need compulsory public coverage whereas the self-
employed, managers, and professionals are free to buy coverage (or not). In that case, moral hazard is controlled by the 
contribution rate: in short, low and middle income cannot “free ride” on the rich as in a system financed through general 
taxes. - 3 - 
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2008). It is certainly not uncontroversial to determine what constitutes a clinically necessary time to 
access a hip replacement on a case-by-case basis but at least the principle is clear.  
In CHI systems, such as the French, a health care good or service is classified as more or less 
necessary depending on the level of the co-payment in the public plan
6. In such a system, the 
delimitation of what is necessary and what belongs to individual responsibility is a combination of 
characteristics of the good or service on one hand, and of the ability to pay of the insured on the other 
hand. Because a co-payment affects utilization through a price effect, and since price effects work 
differently at various income levels, in the French system the same service is deemed less necessary at 
the bottom of the income distribution than at the top
7. Because CHI is almost never priced based on 
ability to pay (this happens in some public large employers but it remains exceptional) but rather on a 
mix of flat rate and risk adjustment (older insured tend to pay substantially more), the combination of 
co-payments in the basic scheme and voluntary CHI to reimburse those raises two equity issues: the 
cost of CHI relative to income is greater for those at the bottom of the income distribution if they decide 
to purchase it; if not the ability to access health care will be diminished, generating an income gradient 
of utilization of medically necessary goods and services. This translates in international comparisons of 
equity of health care utilization: for instance the horizontal inequity indices of ambulatory care utilization 
(probability of any visit to a GP in the past 12 months, total number of visits to a GP, probability of any 
visit to a specialist and total number of visits to a specialist) show levels of pro-rich inequity between 
three and ten times higher in France than in the United Kingdom (van Doorslaer and Masseria, 2004).  
 
A logical response to such an unintended consequence of using co-payments as a way to limit what is 
necessary and falls in the public responsibility is to subsidize the purchase of CHI: if individuals are 
reimbursed a fraction of the cost of their CHI contract, fraction that diminishes when their income 
increases the government can make sure that no household has to spend more than a given share of 
its total income on CHI and that all households who are willing to buy have some CHI and can access 
necessary care. A first step in that direction was made in France in 2000 with the implementation of 
Couverture Maladie Universelle Complémentaire (CMU-C), a means-tested entirely free CHI coverage 
(see a detailed description in, e.g. Grignon et al. 2008). A second step was the creation of Aide à 
l’acquisition d’une complémentaire santé (ACS) in 2005, providing partial reimbursement of the cost of 
a non-group CHI contract for individuals living in households with income between 100% and 115% of 
the cut-off level for CMU-C (see below for a description of the scheme).  
 
                                                 
6   Since co-payments can be covered by a CHI policy they cannot control moral hazard but can split total cost of a service 
between a basic level of coverage and what is the individual’s responsibility. 
7   Another consequence of co-payments and CHI, and one that is more often mentioned in public debates is regressive 
financing: the same co-payment represents a larger share of a small budget and poorer households are hit harder Indeed  
any increase in the rate of co-payment hits harder at the bottom of the income distribution and we do not dispute it. 
However, in a static situation where co-payments are used to determine what is not medically necessary one should not 
be more concerned by the share of co-payments in total income than by the income related differential cost of buying a 
luxury car. As a result, we posit here that the only issue in a social insurance system with co-payments is that of income-
related inequity in the utilization of health care services. - 4 - 
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The implementation of CMU-C has demonstrated clearly that co-payment and CHI generate inequities 
in health care utilization: the utilization of health care by the 10% poorest in France went up to match 
the level of utilization of those with a private CHI when CMU-C was implemented (Grignon et al. 2008). 
However, the second step seems less of a success: despite what could be seen as a generous level of 
subsidy the take-up remains low (at between 10% and 20% of the target population, see Franc and 
Perronnin 2007). This lack of success raises the following question: by how much should the purchase 
of a private CHI be subsidized by the public purse and where should the income cut-off be?  
 
In this research, we measure the efficiency of the subsidy: how high should the subsidy go to entice 
one individual to purchase a CHI contract, and what is the cost in windfall for those who receive the 
subsidy but were ready to purchase a CHI even without it? This is different from the efficiency of 
subsidizing SHI in the UK (Emmerson et al. 2001) or Spain (Lopez-Nicolas and Vera-Hernandez, 
2008), measured as the gain in NHS resources when one individual uses their private SHI policy to 
access private health care. It is much closer to the `bang for the buck` approach of subsidies for private 
insurance in the US (Marquis and Long, 1995; Glied, 2001; Auerbach and Ohri, 2006; Gruber, 2007). 
We also investigate the welfare consequences of the lack of CHI: after all, not everybody should be 
covered by CHI and less than universal coverage for co-payment does not always entail a welfare loss 
(Gruber, 2008, Monheit and Primoff Vistnes, 2006). To address that issue we estimate a function of 
demand for CHI and we disentangle supply-side effects from behavioral and affordability ones. Our 
findings contribute mostly to the debate on co-payments and CHI in health care systems with a strong 
public single payer, such as those found in Europe. However, it might also be of interest to the debate 
in the US on policies such as subsidy to purchase private plans on the non-group market or tax credit to 
increase offerings of employer-sponsored plans aimed at increasing health insurance coverage (Glied 
2001; Swartz, 2001; Zelenak, 2001).  
 
To estimate the demand function for CHI in France we use a linked survey-claims dataset that provides 
individual-level information on CHI (premium paid and whether it is group or non-group), usual socio-
demographics, attitudes toward risk and health, and administrative claims data on health care spending 
and co-payments left by the basic plan.  
 
We model the demand for complementary health insurance as a simplified trade-off between two 
goods: CHI and a composite good reflecting all other consumptions. The model contains two important 
features: first, there is a minimum level of the composite good below which life is not sustainable, so 
that even an infinite level of CHI cannot compensate for a consumption level of the composite good 
below that minimum; second, the “minimum” level of CHI (the level for which they want to receive an 
infinite level of the composite good to be compensated and keep the same level of utility) is negative for - 5 - 
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some individuals (recall they already benefit from basic coverage and lack of CHI only means co-
payments).  
 
Whereas most studies of demand for VHI model a binary variable indicating whether the individual is 
covered or not (e.g. Marquis and Long, 1995; Costa and Garcia, 2003; King and Mossialos, 2005; 
Auerbach and Ohri, 2006; Sabila and Ventelou, 2007) we model the premium paid (including 0s for the 
non-covered). This does not allow us to estimate a price elasticity of the demand for CHI in France but 
we want to model the effect of income, tastes, and supply-side features on the demand for CHI. A 
natural way of estimating the observed demand resulting from such an underlying utility maximizing 
behavior is the Tobit estimator: we use all the information available on the non- group market, including 
individuals without any CHI for which we treat the zero quantity as censored negative quantities.  
 
Even though our econometric strategy does not allow us to estimate the price-elasticity of the demand 
for CHI, we use our model and the parameters estimated for the demand function to simulate the 
response of the demand for CHI to changes in the subsidy.  
 
Our findings are as follows: The main motivation for purchasing CHI in France is protection against a 
financial risk (risk aversion). We also find a very small price effect on the decision to buy a policy 
among the near-poor, thus confirming findings on the decision to buy VHI based on other health care 
systems with a strong public payer (King and Mossialos, 2001, in the UK; Butler, 2001, in Australia; and 
Costa and Garcia, 2003, for Spain) but contrary to what is observed in the US (Auerbach and Ohri, 
2006). We find a very strong income effect on the quantity of CHI demanded, confirming previous 
findings on the decision to buy non-group CHI in the US or in France (Sabila and Ventelou, 2007): in 
our model, individuals with an equivalized household income below €700 (approximately USD900) per 
month are unlikely to buy a CHI policy even if the price was heavily subsidized. Beyond that income 
level, most consumers would buy even with a small subsidy. These findings suggest that subsidizing 
the purchase of CHI is unlikely to be an efficient policy to increase coverage: targeted individuals will 
not buy anyway and those who already buy CHI without subsidy will benefit from a windfall profit, 
making the cost per unit increase in coverage very high. 
 
Section 2 – Health Insurance in France 
 
The market for voluntary, private health insurance in France is a market for complementary health 
insurance (CHI): all legal residents of France are covered by a social scheme (Sécurité sociale) 
financed out of ear-marked income tax (the “social contribution”). The basic plan provides medical, 
drug, and hospital insurance with almost no deductible (some were introduced on ambulatory care in 
2007) and covers dental and eye care (but not prostheses or prescription glasses). User-fees are 
associated with coinsurance and provider over-billing, and a stop-loss clause so that all expenses are - 6 - 
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covered above a specified level. As a result there is an inverted “tunnel” in the social scheme where low 
levels of spending are fully covered as are high levels, leaving a medium range of spending with user- 
fees, representing in some cases as much as 90% of total cost (for a detailed presentation of the 
French system, see Couffinhal and Franc, 2008).  
 
Complementary plans work within the frame of rules and regulations devised by the social scheme to 
select the services and goods they cover, and even benefit from the prices negotiated at the national 
level for all coinsurances: e.g. there is a national retail price for prescription drugs, the social scheme 
reimbursing a given rate (which can be as low as 20%) and the complementary scheme complementing 
the reimbursement to 100% without excluding any drug that is on the social scheme’s formulary, and 
including a marginal number of drugs not reimbursed by the social scheme. There is no real 
competition between plans in terms of coinsurance since all CHI schemes provide full coverage. CHI 
policies differ in the amount they cover for over-billing, dental prostheses and prescription glasses 
(Bocognano et al, 1998; Couffinhal et Perronnin 2004). Over billing is rare for GP services (only 12% of 
GP over bill, Fennina and Geffroy, 2007), can be frequent (38% of specialists) but always limited in 
value (€27 on average, EcoSante, IRDES, 2007) for some ambulatory care specialties (ENT, eye 
specialists, dermatologists), very frequent and of a different magnitude for surgeons in private clinics 
(the social scheme reimburses a fee but private surgeons charge €75 on average above it). It is also 
important to note that CHI plans cover over-billing without any attempt at selecting procedures or 
providers and negotiating prices with providers. 
 
Overall, approximately 78% of total health care expenditures are covered by the social scheme, with 
13% covered by CHI and 9% out-of-pocket (Fennina and Geffroy; 2007, Couffinhal and Franc, 2008). 
Individuals without CHI still have access to medical care and the social scheme covers catastrophic 
expenditures. An individual’s average expenditures not covered by social insurance system are €421 
per year (estimation by the authors based on a representative sample of administrative data), 
substantial if not catastrophic. These expenditures, however, are highly concentrated among a small 
number of individuals.  
 
In 1999, 84% of the population had CHI. Since the introduction of CMU-C in 2000, 9% are without any 
coverage and 2.5% of the population is covered by low-quality CHI plans (not covering any over-billing 
or dental prosthesis or prescription glasses, Franc and Perronnin, 2006). ACS was introduced in 2005 
and it works as a voucher: any eligible individual uses the voucher to get a rebate on the purchase of a 
non-group CHI contract
8 and the supplier of the contract gets reimbursed by the government. The 
voucher amounts to €75 per individual below age 25, €150 per individual ages 25 to 59, and €250 per 
individual ages 60 and older, to individuals living in households above the income cut-off for CMU-C 
                                                 
8   Almost all individual market contracts are eligible: minor restrictions apply to make sure the contract follows the general 
rules implemented by the public fund, namely a GP gatekeeper. - 7 - 
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and below 115% of the cut-off (120% since January 2007). The expected target was 2 million people 
(approximately 3.5% of the population), but only 240,000 had taken it up in November 2006 (and 
330,000 overall after the increase in the cut-off income to 120%, according to the Fonds CMU). The 
average subsidy amounts to almost 40% of the average premium paid by ACS beneficiaries (Franc and 
Perronnin, 2007), and represents 25% of the average premium on the non-group market (ACS 
vouchers are used to purchase lower quality contracts). Still, even with this generous subsidy, the 
subsidy never really took off.  
 
A number of factors potentially explain this low up-take. Aggregate data shows a loading fee in 2003 of 
approximately 20% on average for CHI in France, which is somewhat higher than what is observed in 
other setting (e.g. Gruber (2008) reports 12% for the US) and might indicate one or both of a low level 
of competition or too many small firms in the business. Out of what is paid out to individuals by 
supplementary insurers we estimate that approximately 80% goes to reimburse users’ fees of the social 
scheme with the remaining paying for services not covered by social insurance such as in vitro 
fertilization or alternative medicines
9. 
 
Despite the stop-loss on catastrophic spending user’s fee is concentrated on a subset of individuals. In 
our dataset, which is a representative sample of individuals and administrative claims for 
reimbursement to the social scheme, we are able to describe the distribution of the costs left to patients 
by the social scheme, as well as the distribution of costs for a variety of services (hospital, GPs, 
specialists, drugs, dental care, prescription glasses, transports). Among both those with and without 
CHI in 2004, the 20% top spenders represent 60% of total user charges. The average yearly user 
charge in the top 20% is €1,327, versus €182 among the remaining 80%. Among those without CHI the 
20% top spenders account for 80% of total user fees, and lower averages (€1,235 and €109 
respectively). User charge is more concentrated on hospital, dental and glasses: over these three types 
of service, the 10% top spenders account for 72% of charges, with an average of €782.  
 
                                                 
9   The estimation is as follows: the average user fee is €421 in 2004 and 60% of user fees are paid for by CHI. Multiplying 
60% of €421 by 60 million residents of France yield a total paid on reimbursing user fees of 15.156 billion € for the year 
2004. Over the total outlay from CHI in the Health accounts for the same year (18.966 billion €) this yields a ratio of 80% - 8 - 
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Table 1: Concentration (p% top spenders accounting for X% total spending), average spending 
among p% top spenders and (1-p)% others, for each type of service. 
Service Probability 
(top spenders) 
Share of total  Average 
spending  --top 
spenders (in €) 
Average spending  
others (in €) 
Hospital 5  77%  985  7 
Dental prostheses  5  79%  287  1 
Prescription glasses  5  67%  356  3 
Drugs 20  58%  330  29 
Over-billing -- Specialists  20  69%  123  7 
Over-billing GPs  20  60%  64  11 
Other 20  71%  404  11 
 
From these observations it seems clear that reducing the financial risk stemming from the user charges 
left by the social basic scheme could be an important motivation to purchasing CHI. 
 
Individuals can access CHI through an employer-sponsored contract or on the non-group market. Self-
reports (ESPS 2004, un-weighed, available on IRDES website
10) indicate that 39% of contracts are 
through an employer and 2% through a pool for self-employed. Another 39% are obtained on the non-
group market, and 15% are mixed: these are contracts subscribed by retirees as maintaining the 
coverage they had through their previous occupation (insurers cannot deny coverage and cannot 
increase premiums by more than 50%). The non-group market is more important in France than in the 
US because individuals over the age of 65 are still willing to purchase private insurance. In France 
contributions paid for directly by employers to a CHI contract are not taxed (even though they could be 
considered in-kind wages) but there is no tax credit for individuals purchasing CHI on the non-group 
market or on the employee’s share of the contribution in the group market. 
 
Who are the non-covered for CHI in France? Based on our survey for 2004 the mean equivalized 
household income of the non-covered is €844 per month, compared to €1,382 among those who buy 
CHI. Among those with an income per unit below €1,000, the proportion of non-covered is 24%, versus 
4% only among those with an income with more than €1,900. However, 25% of the non-covered have 
equivalized incomes of more than €1,000, implying that income is not the only cause of non-purchase 
of CHI (some individuals do not buy even though it is affordable). Living in Paris is a main factor of non-
coverage: 19% of Parisians do not purchase CHI, versus 7% of individuals in rural areas. Age is not a 
major factor of non-coverage, with 15% of those younger than 30 being non-covered, versus 11% 
among the 65 and over. 
 
                                                 
10   http://www.irdes.fr/EspaceRecherche/Enquetes/ESPS/Dictionnaire2004/fjaune/fjaune_obtent.html 
 - 9 - 
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Section 3 – A model of the Demand for Complementary Health Insurance 
We develop a model of demand for complementary health insurance that explicitly incorporates a 
threshold of affordability. Assume that individuals maximize utility over two goods: CHI, which they 
consume a quantity x, and a composite consumption, which they consume a quantity c, under a binding 
budget constraint based on current income y (no saving or borrowing): 
Max U(c; x)    s.t. π.x + с  =   y            ( 1 )  
Where: 
с = the numéraire,  
π = the relative price of CHI 
 
In such a model, health care insurance and other consumptions can always be traded off at the margin.  
To model zero-expenditure on the health insurance good, however, we must assume two things: first, 
individuals need a minimum level of the composite good to survive; if c were to fall below that level, no 
amount of x could offset the disutility generated. Second, a positive utility can be obtained even when x 
is negative, subject to c being large enough to compensate.  
 
We generate rational zero-expenditures on x based on the following utility function: 
[]
α α − + − =




G = the minimum consumption of the composite good needed to survive; G  is a concept linked to 
affordability and sometimes referred to as “left to survive” (Murray et al. 2000; Bundorf and Pauly, 
2006). It relates to a general perception of a hierarchy of needs (where CHI would come last) as has 
been suggested by Maslow (1970). It says in substance that families become risk-averse when other 
needs are satisfied, and it is supported by some empirical evidence: Starr-McCluer, (1996) finds that 
uninsured households save less on average than insured ones, other things being equal, and even 
controlling as far as possible for selectivity (behavioral selection), which suggests that affordability 
explains more than aversion to risk of coverage and savings behaviors.  
0 x = a level of insurance coverage such that the marginal rate of substitution between the consumption 
good and insurance is infinite. -x0 is a level of insurance coverage below the current level offered by the 
public mandatory scheme (Sécurité sociale) that would have to be reached to decrease utility to 0 (or 
that would require an infinite level of c to be compensated for in utility terms). This does not mean the 
mandatory scheme covers “too much” in any sense but simply that it is above and beyond the sheer 
minimum individuals can cope with. Introducing that threshold below the public scheme is the main 
innovation of our model and the main rationale for being non-insured even though risk aversion is - 10 - 
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greater at low levels of income. Also: 0-expenditure could be generated with a positive or null 
0 x and 




Graphically, such a utility function is a standard Cobb-Douglas where c and x are substitute in the 
middle range and complements at low values, low being positive for c and negative for x. Figure 1 
shows a first iso-utility curve intersecting the horizontal axis  (consumption of CHI is zero) before the 
optimal solution in CHI (when the budget constraint is tangents to the curve) and a iso-utility curve to 
the north-east (hence for a higher budget level) intersecting the horizontal axis right when the budget 
line tangents the curve. When income is larger (iso-utility to the north-east) the optimal bundle includes 
a positive amount of CHI. 
 
Figure 1: Iso-utility curves in the two-goods space with a positive minimum level of composite 
good and a negative minimum level of CHI.  
   
 
                                                 
11   Bradley also suggests another source of non-affordability namely individual variation in the price of insurance: if loading 
fees increase with some non-health related characteristics, then individuals with the same preferences and budget will 
make different purchasing decisions. This would of course be a rather crucial determinant of non-insurance if the poor 
were systematically over-charged by all insurers (e.g. based on the false assumption that the poor are less careful or 
more prone to moral hazard) and there would not be much cause for subsidizing the price of complementary health 
insurance in that situation. Such an income-based price discrimination does not seem to be observed on the market for 






Locus of optimal 
bundles CHI-C 
0 - 11 - 
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Figure 1 reads as follows:  
 
The iso-utility curve crosses the axis when the slope is greater than the price line at low income levels 
but after at higher income levels (so that there are only corner solutions below a given income level and 
inner ones above it). 
 
The determination of the level of utility (and, therefore, of the budget level) at which the individual 
chooses to buy at least some CHI coverage is easily derived from the utility function:  
First, we derive the expression of c as a function of x (iso-utility curves in the (c,x) space): 
[ ]α α α α
1
1 0 1 0 ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ; (
− − + + = ⇔ + = − ⇔ > = x x v G c x x v G c G c v x c U    (3) 
 
















         ( 4 )  
 







* ) * (
1 *) (






















π      (5) 
 
Hence, there is a value v  such that if v  < v  then x*(v ) < 0: there is no purchase of CHI for these 
accessible levels of utility. Hence, if income is not large enough to grant v  individuals will rationally 
decide they need a negative level of CHI; they would even be happy to partially opt out of the basic plan 
if that could allow them to cut their contribution to the public plan. From equation (5), we find the 












0 x v           ( 6 ) .  
 
The derivation above shows that rational individuals can make the decision not to purchase CHI when 
their income is below a level that would yield a utility level below that minimumv . Of course, all that is 
observed is that below that level individuals do not buy CHI, and above it they buy some. What looks 
like a dichotomous discrete decision (and is very often modeled as such, as we will describe in our 
method section) is here modeled as a continuous decision where the underlying decision is observed 
with censoring. - 12 - 
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In our model, all individuals share the same rational behaviour, most importantly the same underlying 
relationship between income and quantity of CHI purchased. Our empirical estimation is aimed at 
estimating that underlying relationship which reflects affordability of CHI for a given level of income. 
Individuals differ around that underlying effect of income in their preferences for insurance, and this is 
reflected in the parameter x
0 that is allowed to vary across individuals in our models (as taste shifters). 
We detail below in the next section the preference shifters that we use to characterize tastes and 
individual variation around affordability.  
 
We will use the parameters (slope of the income effect and taste shifters) estimated in our econometric 
estimation to simulate the effect of a price subsidy on the quantity of coverage individuals, at a given 
level of income, would purchase on average. We use the model to derive a response function of 
coverage to price and, therefore, to the level of the subsidy and we are able to get this without directly 
estimating the price-elasticity of the demand for CHI. 
 
The derivation of the effect of the subsidy works as follows:  
 
The relationship between x* and y is straightforward, and we will use it to evaluate the parameters of 
interest {π, α, x0}: 
 
Substituting c = y – πx in 
α α − + − =
1 0) ( ) ( ) ; ( x x G c x c U  yields: 
U(x) = 
α α π
− + − −
1 0) ( ) ( x x G x y  
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       ( 7 ) .    
 
We use (7) to simulate the impact of a price subsidy. The price subsidy is simulated as a reduction in π, 
the price of coverage (loading fee). All we need to do is to use (7) to calculate the percentage of 
individuals at a given level y with an x* at least equal to an arbitrary level (what the government wants 
individuals to buy) for all levels of price below the market price. - 13 - 
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Our empirical model provides an estimate for the slope of the income effect, therefore providing a value 
for (1-α)/π in equation (7). The empirical model also provides a value for the second member on the 
right-hand side of equation (7), which is the taste shifter 
0 x  plus a constant, and we use that value for 
each individual in our sample to calculate an individual value for x*.  
 
In order to derive numerical values for
0 x , and then, x* we need to assign values to two parameters: 
G and π.  G  is given by the CMU-C cut-off income, and we use a reasonable assumption for the 
loading fee π. 
 




Our dataset is a survey on health, health care, and health insurance linked to administrative claims data 
on expenditures on health care for each type of service (hospital stays, visits, dental care). The survey 
was conducted in 2004, and administrative claims data covers the period January to December of 
2004. For each type of services administrative claims data indicates the total amount spent during the 
year by the individual, as well as the share reimbursed by the social scheme. Hence, we know the total 
amount of user’s charges paid by the individual or their complementary insurance.  
 
We drop all individuals with CHI obtained through their employer (even partially) and restrict our 
population to those with a non-group contract (including retirees) and those with no CHI at all. The 
reason for doing it is that individuals who benefit from some contribution from an employer (or spouse’s 
employer) cannot always tell the true value of the premium paid and would not know the share of the 
contribution (if any) they paid out of their own pocket. We therefore keep the 9% of the population who 
are not covered as well as 33% of the population who purchased their policy on the non-group market 
only (33% is the product of 39% and 84%: 84% are covered privately and 39% of those covered 
privately purchased on the non-group market without any contribution from an employer). Overall, then 
our sub-sample is comprised of 42% of the initial population; non-covered represent 21% of our study 
sample (versus 9% of total population, when those covered on the group market are included).  
 
An implication of restricting our sample to those individuals is that we neglect the selection process in 
the group market and assume all individuals offered some employer-sponsored contract (either directly 
or as spousal benefits) took it up. We therefore assume that those without CHI are individuals who are - 14 - 
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on the market for non-group contracts and renounced these contracts, but never had access to group 
contracts that they declined. This is certainly a strong assumption if one believes individuals may reject 
an employer plan they deem too generous and expensive, or select jobs according to their offering 
good quality employer-sponsored CHI. The only data available in our sample regards civil servants: in 
France, all civil servants are offered a group contract that they are free to reject and, as a result, it is the 
only group for whom we can be sure they were offered such a plan; our survey indicates that, out of the 
396 respondents who report working as civil servants or for public entities, 24 only are without CHI. 
Generalizing from civil servants we make the assumption that individuals will tend to take up an 
employer’s plan which is almost certainly cheaper than any non-group coverage
12.  
 
Not all respondents who reported some non-group coverage answered the questions on CHI, income, 
or health. We treat missing values for independent variables as follows. For categorical variables 
(education or health status) we include all observations but define one category as “missing”. For 
continuous variables we test two strategies: (1) we categorized the variable, created a “missing” 
category just as for other categorical variables, and included all observations; and (2) retained the 
continuous specification of the variable but dropped all observations with a missing value. We exclude 
721 observations with missing information on the premium paid for CHI, which preclude constructing 
the dependent variable (19% of those with non-group CHI). As described below we control the impact 
of exclusions based on a sample selection model. See table 2 for the impact of various exclusions on 
our analysis sample. 
 
Table 2: Sample size and exclusions 
 











Individuals with no group CHI 
(including those with no CHI) 
5,106 4,385 3,644  3,618 
Individuals with a non-group 
CHI policy 
3,762 3,041 2,658  2,645 
 
                                                 
12   The plan offered to civil servants is not very generous and it might therefore be somewhat presumptuous to generalize 
from this small population. On the other hand the plan offered to civil servants is not the most cost effective of all group 
plans. - 15 - 
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The typical econometric model of demand of non-group health insurance (in the US: Marquis and Long, 
1995; Auerbach and Ohri, 2006; in France: Saliba and Ventelou, 2007) examines the dichotomous 
decision to purchase or not purchase insurance. In the French case, the proportion of individuals with 
CHI is higher and it is of greater interest to understand the quantity demanded rather than the 
probability of having any coverage.   
 
On the right hand side of the equation are found: income, taste shifters (education, health status), and a 
price variable. US studies construct the price variable as a premium for a standard plan with $1,000 
deductible (Auerbach and Ohri, 2006). The premium is imputed on individuals based on their individual 
(age, gender, health status) and local (state level) characteristics (medical price index and policies 
affecting community rating). In the case of CHI in France, Saliba and Ventelou (2007) identify a 
premium effect but it is not clear exactly how it is calculated and they do not present any elasticity 
result.  
 
Our empirical approach is to model the quantity of coverage demanded rather than the probability of 
being uninsured (in the U.S., Thomas (1995) uses the same strategy). This is similar to estimating the 
latent variable underlying the binary choice of being insured or not. However, it puts emphasis on 
different dimensions of the demand function: in the binary choice models, “price” is measured as the 
premium paid by an individual with a given level of risk for a standardized contract (and level of 
coverage). The price elasticity reflects mostly the underlying risk of the individual and, less importantly 
any local (state) regulations affecting rating (e.g. community rating). In such specifications, price 
influences demand in two opposite directions: as any price of a standard good, a higher premium yields 
a lower quantity demanded; but, simultaneously, since a higher risk-adjusted premium reflects a higher 
“need”, a higher premium yields a higher level of demand. Econometrically, the price variable is not 
exogenous in these models.  
 
In this strategy the true price of insurance is the loading fee (premium divided by expected benefit) and 
demand is the quantity of coverage, defined as expected benefit given the parameters of the plan such 
as deductibles and co-insurance rates. However, we cannot replicate Thomas’s strategy: we do not 
know the detailed parameters of the plan each individual buys and, as a result, we cannot calculate the 
expected benefit
13. We use the premium paid per person covered by the contract as our dependent 
                                                 
13   We are able to construct some rough measure of the level of coverage: a sub-sample of respondents was interviewed 
four years before and asked to describe the guarantees on their policy (at the time of this prior interview, which means 
there is no certainty it is the same policy for which the premium is known). Based on these self-reports we are able to - 16 - 
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variable (for the measurement of the variable see below): as a result we model the consumption of 
insurance (unit price by volume) rather than the quantity. 
One consequence is that we do not have any real price variable: we do not observe the loading fee at 
the individual level. We use proxies based on the risk adjusters (mostly age, gender and family size) of 
CHI operators and regional dummies to control for variations in medical and dental prices and for 
variations in the unit price of coverage charged to the individual
14. We will estimate the price elasticity of 
the demand for CHI based on our calibration of the utility function: the econometric equation will yield 
values for the iso-utility curves and the budget line which will allow us to calculate the slope of the 
demand line (quantity-price response).  
 
Although we do not observe the parameters of an individual’s CHI plan and, as a result, cannot 
estimate the expected benefit, our dataset does link the premium paid for coverage with a set of 
variables rarely observed in the same dataset: health care expenditures, income, demographics 
(education, occupation, health status).  
 
Calculation of the premium was, in most cases, straightforward. The individual is covered by one 
contract only and we know how many individuals are covered by the non-group contract (these are 
members of the same household). We calculate the value of CHI consumed by that individual as total 
premium paid divided by the number of persons covered. Some cases are trickier though, when the 
same individual is covered by several contracts. In such a case we calculate , for each of these 
contracts, the value of insurance per person in the contract, and we sum these values to measure the 
total value of consumption of CHI by that individual. We exclude individuals with at least one employer-
sponsored CHI therefore we calculate the total value of non-group CHI per individual. In these cases 
the value of the variable Covpers in the model is the average over all contracts (usually two) of the 
number of individuals covered by each contract. The average total premium on the non-group market is 
€527 per year.  
                                                                                                                                                          
categorize the policies into four categories (low coverage, medium, high coverage with an emphasis on dental care, and 
high coverage with an emphasis on eye care). Our calculations show a strong and positive correlation between premiums 
and quality and, more importantly, no price discrimination effect: for a given level of quality, age, and family size, the 
premium paid is independent of household’s income. We therefore reject the hypothesis that insurers charge higher 
premiums on poorer households for the same level of quality. Data are not presented here but are available on request. 
14   This is based on an assumption that the loading fee does not vary across regions or départements in France. A recent 
study shows variations in the average premium for a given policy according to location in France (60 millions de 
consommateurs, 2008) but this does not prove that the loading fee per se varies: we interpret these variations as 
reflecting variations in the price of medical services across regions rather than variations in loading fees. Such an 
interpretation is reasonable because it is now more and more often the case that individuals purchase CHI online, by 
mail, or through brokers and would not, as a result, be constrained to pay a higher price per unit of coverage than in a 
neighboring region.  - 17 - 
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Independent variables:  
 
Income is our main variable of interest in the econometric equation. It reflects the effect of the budget 
line on the iso-utility curve in the two-goods space. Individuals who did not report on the value of their 
income are imputed the median of their income class when this information is available in the survey. 
We define household income as income per consumption units based on the CMU equivalence scale 
(which is similar to the OECD scale) which assigns a weight of 1 for the first individual in the household, 
.5 fors the second one, .3 fors the third and fourth ones, and .4 thereafter. When working with 
categorical income we define the following seven categories: income below €700 per month (the cut-off 
for ACS); 700 to 999; 1,000 to 1,299; 1,300 to 1,599; 1,600 to 1,899; 1,900 to 2,199; and 2,200 and 
above. 
 
Since the premium paid by an individual is a function of the level of coverage (how much of the over-
billing is covered by the plan) and of the expected cost of the individual, we enter the main variables 
used by insurers to charge the insured: age and family size.  
 
The shape of the iso-utility curve depends on the utility of being covered.  
We describe it as follows: 
 
Risk reduction: Individuals purchase insurance to reduce the financial risk of having to spend for 
treatment when sick (they protect their wealth). Two main theoretical frameworks of risk reduction lead 
to different ways of measuring the gain of CHI in reducing risk. 
 
Expected utility: Under the assumption that the amount spent on medical care in a given year is 
a random variable, individuals with a concave utility of wealth are better off with full coverage 
and are therefore willing to pay a certain actuarially fair premium to reduce the uncertain loss 
generated by user charges. In this standard expected utility framework, the poor are more 
willing to purchase insurance (under the standard assumption that the utility function is of the 
decreasing absolute risk aversion type) and we expect that introducing such a variable will 
increase the positive effect of income on the amount of CHI an individual purchases. We 
calculate the value of risk reduction according to the expected utility theory as follows:  
We introduce the risk reduction motive in our demand equation as the risk premium:  
P(Y) = Y – U
-1[(1-p)U(Y)+pU(Y-D)] with Y the income (wealth) of the individual, p the probability 
to be in the top spenders population, and D the average amount of spending within that 
population. Following our estimation in section 2 we use 0.2 for p and 1,235 for a value of D. 
We model U as Y
1/2 in our baseline scenario. 
 - 18 - 
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Another model of risk reduction is the prospect theory (Khaneman and Tversky, 1978): 
according to that theory the value of risk reduction is independent of income and increases at a 
decreasing rate with the value of damage (yearly user charge). We enter it in our demand 
equation as follows: we use the administrative data to calculate expected values of spending 
over various sub-populations defined by health status that we impute to individuals according to 
their health status.  
 
Attitude toward risk and uncertainty: Barsky et al (1997) and Monheit and Primoff Vistnes (2006) have 
demonstrated that attitudes toward risk and preferences regarding insurance are important 
determinants of the purchase of group insurance as people seek jobs offering employer-sponsored 
insurance. We enter variables describing general atttudes toward risk in the model; however none of 
these variables reached significance in .our estimations and we ultimately dropped these from our 
preferred model. 
 
Commitment to spend on health care: individuals bind themselves into consuming health care (e.g. 
dental prostheses) that will be beneficial in the long run but is not needed in the short run. They 
anticipate that they will need to spend on dental care or prescription glasses and they use the CHI as 
an ear-marked saving device. The main reason for such a costly behavior (they have to pay the 20% 
loading fee on top of medical costs) is that they do not trust themselves in spending the money on 
these goods or services (e.g. if they had saved ahead of time). To account for such a motive, we enter 
the individual amount of user charges during the calendar year of the interview in the right hand side of 
our demand equation. 
 
Our model does not encompass Nyman’s (1999) suggestion that individuals purchase insurance in part 
to gain access to treatments that they would never be able to afford with their income or even their 
accumulated savings and credit. Such a motive is credible in the American context but seems unlikely 
in the case of CHI in France because individuals in need of a very expensive treatment get full 




In order to provide the intuition of the relationships we want to estimate, we start with a simple OLS 
(model 1 below). However, because we want to model a demand function with unobserved (censored) 
negative utilities, the Tobit is the best-suited estimator and will be our preferred strategy. We use the 
sample of individuals who are not covered on the group market, which includes those with a CHI policy 
and those who answered they had no coverage at all. Our dependent variable takes the value of the 
premium for those with a CHI policy on the non-group market and who agreed to provide a value for the - 19 - 
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premium and a value of 0 for those who are not covered. The problem with that population is that a 
substantial proportion of the population was not able (or not willing) to report a value for the premium 
paid for their CHI policy and, as a result, cannot be used in the model. A first consequence is that non-
covered individuals (for whom the dependent variable is always known) represent a larger share of the 
sample of individuals with non-group CHI and information on premium (including those with no CHI) 
than of the true population (approximately 31% instead of 26%). Finally, the non-covered represent 
27% of the sample used to run the model 2 below (subset with information on all variables). 
 
We also run a Heckman sample-selection model: a first equation (Logit) estimates the probability that 
an individual will not report the value of the premium for their CHI policy on the following variables: age, 
gender, education, self-assessed health, and site and type of conurbation (rural, urban lower than 
200,000, urban larger than 200,000, Paris). We then use the inverse Mill’s ratio (IMR) in an OLS 
estimate of the premium, estimated on the sub-population with no coverage or a coverage with a 
reported premium (model 3 below). 
 
We also run a sensitivity check on the effect of non-responses on the income variable: in the OLS 
version, we include income as a categorical (rather than continuous, with seven categories) variable 
and we run two estimations, one restricted to the population with a reported income, and one on the 
total population with ‘non reported income’ being one supplementary category. Results (not reported 
here but available on request) confirm that excluding observations with missing income does not 
change the coefficients and significance values. In the sample-selection model, we also tried with a first 
step where the non response bias on premium is controlled for a dummy variable taking the value 1 for 
individuals who refused to provide information on their income. This improves substantially the fit of the 
first step but leaves the coefficients on income unchanged in the second step.  
 
One thing we were not able to assess empirically is the assumption in the Tobit that the same 
determinants are at play for the selection process (to buy or not a CHI) and conditional consumption 
(once the decision has been made, how much of CHI to purchase). It is possible that individuals 
anticipating higher premiums are deterred from seeking CHI in the first place, and, as a result, some 
characteristics, such as age would have a negative impact on the probability and a positive one on 
conditional consumption. This is not likely for CHI in France, however, since we observe that individuals 
who pay higher premiums (e.g., the elderly) are also more likely to be covered. 
 
Moreover, because the origin of censoring might come from a supply side issue (the transaction costs 
of supplying a low level of CHI might be too high) as well as from the demand side issue tested so far, 
we re-estimate the demand function with a censoring threshold at 200 instead of 0 (it appears that very 
few contracts are worth less than €200 per year and per person in our dataset). The findings are not - 20 - 
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qualitatively changed: the slope for income is slightly steeper as is the impact of going from 1 to 2 
persons covered. 
 
Section 5 – Results  
 
In this section we present the results of the models where variables which were never significant (over 
all models) are excluded. These variables are sex, self-assessed health, and attitudes toward risk. The 
fact that health does not affect the amount of premium confirms the absence of adverse selection in the 
choice of CHI in France already shown in Buchmueller et al. 2004 (if anything there would be a small 
propitious selection effect, individuals in better health being also more likely to purchase a policy). 
 
Table 3: Estimates, three main models (OLS, Tobit and Heckit): dependent is the value of the 
premium paid. 
  Variable      Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 OLS  Tobit  Sample 
selection 
  Constant  232.54 ***  -666.71 **  372.55 *** 
  User charge  28.38 **  63.42 ***  26.65 * 
  User charge squared  -1.42  -4.39 **  -1.27 
  Age  -0.87  2.45 **  -1.34 
  Age squared  0.07 ***  0.06 ***  0.08 *** 
  Number of covered persons (NCP)  -70.61 ***  467.59  ***  -68.42 *** 
  NCP, squared        4.61  -70.19  ***  4.36 
  Income/1000  189.63 ***  223.13  ***  183.12 *** 
  Income/1000, squared  -25.02 ***  -30.36  ***  -24.41 *** 
  Income/1000, cubic  0.80 ***  1.03   ***  0.78 *** 
  Risk premium  6.87 ***  1.69    6.65 *** 
IMR     -421.92  ** 
      
#  Observations  2645  3618  2641 
Adjusted R2 (Log Likelihood)  0.2790  -19590  0.28 
Scale   346.25   
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level.     
 
The variables used by insurers to determine the premiums (risk-related variables): age, age squared, 
and the number of persons covered (as well as its squared value) are always significant and with the 
expected signs.  - 21 - 
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Consumption of CHI increases with age squared: for an individual aged 60 the premium is increased by 
€252, or 44% of the average (in model 1). 
The fact that the premium decreases with the number of individuals in the contract is observed as well 
in the US (Gruber, 2008) and stems from a cross subsidy of large families by single individuals 
(insurers do not charge the same fee on families). There is no clear explanation for such a cross-
subsidy except that insurers benefit from lower transaction costs when they enroll a whole family rather 
than separate individuals (personal communication from insurers in the Fédération Nationale de la 
Mutualité Française).  
 
The commitment motive (social scheme user charge) is significant but its effect is limited: the variable is 
measured in €1,000, hence each supplementary € in user charges is associated with between €0.03 
and €0.06 in terms of supplementary consumption of CHI. The risk premium is positive and significant 
in models 1 and 4, and positive but not significant in models 2 and 3. It is positive in all models 
indicating as expected that the poor are more willing to purchase (they benefit more from risk reduction) 
than the rich.  
 
The IMR is significant indicating that, among respondents, not providing information on the premium 
paid is systematically linked to the value of insurance consumed. The coefficients on income are slightly 
different when this bias is controlled for but qualitative results are the same as in models 2 and 3. This 
is the main conclusion we draw from this estimate: even though the selection mechanism of non-
reporting on the premium is systematically linked to the level of the premium, not accounting for it 
biases the coefficients on other determinants (mostly income) only minimally. As a result, we will use a 
simple version of the Tobit estimator without correcting for the non-reporting bias. 
 
Last the income effect is strong and always significant and, as expected, steeper when the Tobit 
estimator is used. It is summarized in figure 2. 
 - 22 - 
Income and the Demand for Complementary Health Insurance in France 
Michel Grignon and Bidénam Kambia-Chopin    Irdes – April 2009 
Figure 2: Effect of income on the reported premium paid for non-group CHI (0 if no CHI) 
according to various models (for the Tobit we report for the latent variable; for the Heckit, we 
report the second step with the control for IMR). 
 
 
The slope around 1000 is approximately 0.14. Hence π = (1-α)/0.14              (8) 
 
Section 6 – Simulations of the Impact of Premium Subsidies on the Demand for CHI 
 
We need a “reasonable” assumption for π. We assume a loading fee π  = 1.3. This is based on 
aggregate data indicating a loading fee of 20% on all group and non-group contracts and the 
knowledge that non-group policies are usually more expensive. Based on (8), such a choice yields α = 
0.82, which is plausible.  
 
For each individual, the negative value of “minimum” CHI is given by: 
x
0 = (-Tobit(i) -0.14*G)/0.82 
 
Where Tobit(i) is the predicted value from the model neutralizing the effect of income (but including the 
random value from the residual) for the individual i. For each individual in our sample, we draw a 
random number in a normal distribution with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of the Scale - 23 - 
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parameter from the tobit. We use the predicted deterministic values for the un-censored demand for 
CHI (the latent variable) and the random number to generate these Tobit(i) for each observation i.  
 
We then run the simulations as follows: once we know x0, we can calculate the demand for CHI as a 
function of its price π (








= ), and, given a target consumption of CHI (the 
‘appropriate’ level the government wants to encourage, x*), the implicit price that CHI should be 
charged to make sure individuals will buy it: 
0 *









We run two sets of simulations, one using a target level (appropriate quantity of insurance) x* = €50, 
meaning €600 per year and person, somewhat higher than the €527 average of non-group premiums, 
and the second one based on a monthly premium of €44 (or €528 per year). 
 
Figure 3: Relationship between the subsidy level and the proportion of individuals willing to buy 
the level of CHI deemed appropriate by the government, here assumed at €50 per month.  
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Among those with less than €700 per month (close to the ACS cut-off income threshold at 675
15), 54% 
would buy less than x* with a price as low as 0.1 (meaning a subsidy of 1.2/1.3 = 92%), and still 38% 
                                                 
15   It must be noted that some individuals in our sample report incomes that would make them eligible to CMU-C, i.e. below 
€587 per month, even though they do not state they actually benefit from it. We have no way of deciding whether they 
under-report their income, are eligible to CMU but did not claim it, or failed to report their being covered by it. As a result, 
we decided to include these observations in our study and simulation (we have excluded all individuals reporting they are 
covered by CMU, however). - 24 - 
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would be in the same situation with a price of 0. Above the cut-off threshold and below €800, a price of 
0.8 would deter 42% of consumers to buy the target level of CHI, but a price of 0.7 would convince 77% 
of them; the gain is almost flat after that (with 80% reaching the appropriate level for a price of 0.4) until 
0.1 where it goes up to 96%. Subsidizing the cost of CHI by approximately 50% (0.7/1.3) seems to be 
efficient in that income bracket. Between €800 and 900 per month, the efficient level of price is 1.0 (no 
loading fee at all, meaning a subsidy of 1/1.3 = 23%), where 71% reach the appropriate level (up from 
63% with a price of 1.1). 
 
Below the ACS cut-off income threshold, older customers (65+) might be easier to convince: with a 
price of 0.2 (subsidy of 85%) 54% of them buy the appropriate level (versus 30% only among the young 
and adults). Similarly, with a price of 0.7, 93% of the 65+ in the income bracket €700-799 buy the target 
level of CHI. One has to keep in mind, however, that, since insurers charge more for elderly individuals, 
any proportional subsidy will be more costly to the public purse when targeted on the elderly. 
 
With a target at €44 instead of 50, no much changes below the ACS threshold; however, the efficient 





We have investigated the determinants of the demand for complementary health insurance (CHI) in 
France. We estimate a Tobit where total consumption of CHI (premium paid, which is the quantity of 
coverage multiplied by its unit price) is the dependent variable. We find that the main motivation for 
purchasing CHI in France is the reduction of the financial risk left by the basic social scheme. We also 
find a very strong income effect: the consumption of CHI increases (at a decreasing rate) with income. 
We then turn to the relationship between income and demand with an aim at simulating the effect of 
various subsidizing mechanisms on the purchase of “appropriate” contracts of CHI. We find that 
individuals with an income below €700 per month and consumption unit are very unlikely to buy an 
“appropriate” quantity of CHI even if the unit price was heavily subsidized. Beyond that income level, 
most consumers would buy the appropriate level even with a small subsidy. These findings suggest that 
subsidizing the purchase of CHI might not be the most efficient policy: targeted individuals will not buy 
anyway and the ‘bang for the buck’ will always be very low (those who already buy CHI without subsidy 
will benefit from a windfall profit that will be very costly for the public purse). This suggests that the 2005 
income-tested subsidy for the purchase of reasonable quality complementary health insurance (ACS) is 
not the suitable policy to reduce the number of uninsured in France. 
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Income and the Demand for Complementary Health Insurance in France
Michel Grignon (McMaster University; Irdes), Bidénam Kambia-Chopin (Irdes)
This paper examines the demand for complementary health insurance (CHI) in the non-group market in France 
and the reasons why the near poor seem price insensitive. First we develop a theoretical model based on a simple 
trade-off between two goods: CHI and a composite good reflecting all other consumptions. Then we estimate a 
model of CHI consumption and empirically test the impact of potential determinants of demand for coverage: risk 
aversion, asymmetrical information, non-expected utility, the demand for quality and health, and supply-side factors 
such as price discrimination. We interpret our empirical findings in terms of crossed price and income elasticity of the 
demand for CHI. Last, we use these estimates of elasticity to simulate the effect of various levels of price subsidies on 
the demand for CHI among those with incomes around the poverty level in France. We find that the main motivation 
for purchasing CHI in France is protection against the financial risk associated with copayments in the public health 
insurance scheme. We also observe a strong income effect suggesting that affordability might be an important 
determinant. Our simulations indicate that no policy of price subsidy can significantly increase the take-up of CHI 
among the near poor; any increase in the level of subsidy generates a windfall benefit for richer households.
L’impact du revenu sur la demande de couverture complémentaire santé
Michel Grignon (McMaster University ; Irdes), Bidénam Kambia-Chopin (Irdes)
Nous étudions la demande de couverture complémentaire santé individuelle en France ainsi que les motifs qui 
expliquent pourquoi la demande d’assurance des individus aux revenus modestes n’est pas sensible au montant 
de la prime d’assurance. Dans un premier temps, nous développons un modèle théorique d’arbitrage entre deux 
biens : la complémentaire santé et un bien composite reflétant toutes les autres consommations. Dans un second 
temps, nous estimons un modèle de consommation d’assurance et testons l’effet des déterminants de la demande 
d’assurance à savoir l’aversion au risque, les asymétries d’information, la théorie de la non-espérance d’utilité et des 
facteurs liés à l’offre d’assurance tels que la discrimination par les prix. Nous trouvons que la consommation d’assurance 
complémentaire s’explique par un comportement de réduction du risque financier associé aux débours pour les soins 
de santé dans le cadre du modèle standard de l’utilité espérée. Ces résultats sont ensuite utilisés pour simuler l’impact 
des variantes de l’Aide à l’acquisition d’une complémentaire santé (ACS) sur l’achat d’une couverture complémentaire. 
Les résultats des simulations indiquent que l’incitation financière ne fonctionne pas dans le sens voulu : ceux qui sont 
sensibles à la subvention de l’achat de leur assurance achètent déjà le produit et ceux qui ne l’achètent pas ne changent 
pas leur comportement même avec une forte subvention. En conclusion, il vaudrait mieux augmenter le plafond de 
ressources de la CMU-C si on veut modifier sensiblement les comportements de couverture.